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We use a panel of manufacturing plants from Colombia to analyze how the rise in payroll tax rates
over the 1980s and 1990s affected the labor market.  Our estimates indicate that formal wages fall
by between 1.4% and 2.3% as a result of a 10% rise in payroll taxes.  This "less-than-full-shifting"
is likely to be the result of weak linkages between benefits and taxes and the presence of downward
wage rigidities in Colombia.  Because the costs of taxation are only partly shifted from employers
to employees, employment also falls.  Our results indicate that a 10% increase in payroll taxes lowered
formal employment by between 4% and 5%.  In addition, we find some evidence of less shifting and
larger disemployment effects for production than for non-production workers.  These results suggest
that policies aimed at boosting the relative demand of less-skill workers by reducing social security
taxes may be effective in Latin American countries, where minimum wages bind and benefits are often









Center for International Development





Latin American and other developing countries, like developed countries, rely on 
payroll taxes to finance the provision of pensions, benefits for disability and maternity, and 
compensation for work injuries for employees.  Mandated contributions in Latin America 
are on average close to European levels, but much higher in some countries such as 
Argentina, Colombia, and Uruguay were payroll taxes are around 40% (Gill, Truman and 
Yermo (2005)).  In Europe, the countries with the highest mandated contributions face 
payroll taxes as high as 30% and in the less-regulated British and North American labor 
markets these contributions are between 15% and 20%. 
In Latin America, like in Europe, high payroll taxes have often been blamed for the 
high labor costs faced by employers and for discouraging employment.  However, the 
theoretical analysis of payroll taxation is ambiguous in terms of the impact of payroll taxes 
on labor markets.  When workers value the benefits financed through payroll taxes as much 
as the contributions cost employers, rises in payroll taxes should be fully shifted from firms 
to employees in the form of lower wages with no disemployment effects.  On the other 
hand, if wages are rigid or payroll taxes finance benefits not fully accrued by employees, 
workers will not absorb the entire cost of the payroll taxes and employment will fall. 
Empirical evidence on the impact of payroll taxation for different countries is also 
mixed.  Previous results range from full-shifting to little shifting and large disemployment 
effects.
1  Studies that exploit both cross-section and time series variation seem most likely 
to find full shifting.  For example, Gruber (1994, 1997) and Gruber and Krueger (1991), 
                                                           
1 Even for a single country, there is often a wide range of results.  For example, for the U.S., Gordon (1972) 
finds full-shifting; Hamermesh (1979) and Vroman (1974) less-than-full-shifting, and Kaester (1996) finds no 
shifting for young workers.  Hamermesh (1993), Blau and Kahn (1999) and Nickell and Layard (1999) 
provide excellent reviews of studies on the impact of payroll taxes for various countries as well as of cross-
country analyses.   4
which rely on cross-section and time-series variation in Chile for social security 
contributions and in the U.S. for disability insurance and maternity benefits, find full wage 
shifting of employer contributions and no disemployment effects.  Gruber (1997) notes, 
however, that “applicability of the [U.S.] studies to other types of payroll taxation and to 
other countries is uncertain.” This is partly because there may be a closer tax-benefit 
linkage in the case of disability benefits and maternity health insurance than in the case of 
savings for retirement.  In addition, Gruber (1994) and Gruber and Krueger (1991) consider 
relatively small increases in payroll taxes in the U.S. which can be easily passed on as 
lower wages. By contrast, Gruber (1997) considers a large reduction in payroll taxes 
following the privatization of the social security system in Chile which was passed on to 
workers as higher wages.  However, given labor market rigidities and weak linkages 
between benefits and contribution in most of Latin America, the study for Chile may not be 
generalized in terms of the labor market consequences of payroll taxes in Latin America.  
Given binding minimum wages in Latin America (see, e.g., Maloney and Núñez, 2004), it 
may be more difficult to pass a large increase in payroll taxes on to workers as lower wages 
than to pass a large reduction in payroll taxes as higher wages as was the case in Chile.  
Moreover, most Latin American countries rely on pay-as-you-go social security systems 
and face weak linkages between pensions and other benefits, on the one hand, and 
contributions, on the other, which would make workers less willing to pay for the benefits 
in the form of lower wages and encourage them to move to the informal sector.
2 
As in Gruber (1997), we examine the effects of changes in payroll taxes on formal 
employment and wages in Latin America.  However, contrary to Gruber (1997), we look at 
                                                           
2 See Maloney (2004, 1999), Maloney and Bosch (2006), Maloney, Goni and Bosch (2007), and Levy (2006) 
for a view of the formal/informal sectors as characterized by large job-to-job movements and voluntary entry   5
the effects of a large increase in payroll taxes in Latin America over the 1980s and 1990s 
and, in particular, at the large increase in payroll taxes for pensions and health of 10.5% 
following the Colombian social security reform of 1993.  It is especially interesting to 
contrast the Colombian and the Chilean cases because the effects of payroll taxes may be 
asymmetric.  If wages are flexible upwards but not down, there could be full shifting in 
response to a large reduction in payroll taxes but not in response to a large increase.  Recent 
studies suggest that minimum wages bind in Colombia and other Latin American countries 
(see Maloney and Núñez (2004) for evidence on Latin America, including Colombia, and 
Arango and Pachón (2004), Bell (1997) and Santamaría (1999) for further evidence on 
Colombia), pointing to an important source of downward wage rigidities in this continent. 
   Our study uses a balanced panel of plants in the formal sector from the Annual 
Survey of Manufacturers in Colombia over the period 1982-96.  This data set has 
information on total contributions as well as on wages and employment.  Following Gruber 
(1997), we construct tax rates for each plant by dividing total contributions by wages rather 
than by imputing tax rates as in other studies.  Most of the variation we exploit is temporal 
variation in payroll taxes.  In fact, average increases in the constructed tax rates closely 
correspond with the statutory changes in payroll taxes over time. While there is some cross-
sectional variation in the changes in tax rates in the Colombian data, these deviations of 
changes in tax rates above and below the statutory changes are very small. Moreover, the 
changes are distributed evenly above and below the statutory changes suggesting that these 
deviations are related to either true sources of variation (e.g., the degree of accident risk 
across plants) or measurement error. If deviations were due primarily to plants trying to 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
into the informal sector as a result of inefficiencies in formal sector protections.   6
avoid paying taxes by either hiring informal or temporary workers, in which case we would 
observe deviations to be heavily skewed below the statutory tax increases. 
Estimates controlling for plant-specific trends suggest that a 10% increase in payroll 
taxes reduces wages by between 1.4% and 2.3% and employment by between 4% and 5%.  
There also appears to be less shifting and greater disemployment for production than for 
non-production workers.  Less shifting and more disemployment for production workers 
may be due to the fact that the minimum wage is more likely to bind for this group of 
workers.  The weaker link between benefits and contributions for production workers could 
also be due to the fact that these workers are more likely to turn to the informal sector if 
their wages are lowered.  An implication of these results is that reductions in payroll taxes 
for low-wage workers, often proposed as a way to boost the relative demand of low-skill 
workers, may be an effective measure to reduce unemployment and informal activity 
among young and unskilled workers in Latin America, especially if tax cuts are targeted to 
indirect benefits. 
Besides our study, and Gruber (1997) before ours, other studies have looked at the 
impact of labor costs (including payroll taxes) in Latin America. Hamermesh (2004) 
provides a summary and interpretation of results in recent studies for Latin America.  These 
studies, however, construct variables of labor costs that pool payroll taxes with either 
wages or dismissal costs, making it difficult to interpret the effect of payroll taxes alone.  A 
number of studies for Latin America, instead, use individual micro data to compare the 
wages of formal and informal sector employees (e.g., Cox and Edwards, 1997; McIsaac and 
Rama, 1997; Mondino and Montoya, 2004; and Vargas, 2004), who differ in terms of their 
exposure to payroll taxes but also in terms of their exposure to other regulations. In contrast 
to these studies, our analysis explicitly measures tax rates separately from other labor costs.   7
The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 illustrates the effects of payroll taxes 
on wages and employment in situations with and without wage rigidities.  Section 3 
describes the Colombian institutional background and the changes in mandated payroll 
taxes in Colombia over the 1980s and 1990s, including the changes in payroll taxes 
following the Colombian social security reform of 1993.  Section 4 describes the data and 
presents the results.  Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Theoretical Effects of Payroll Taxes 
  In this section we discuss the impact of payroll taxes on wages and employment 
under different labor market environments.  We begin by showing the effects of payroll 
taxes in a competitive labor market. 
The representative firm chooses employment, Li, to maximize profits, 
πi = pF(Li) − w(1+τ)Li, 
taking the price, p, the wage, w, and the employment level of other firms as given, where 
F(Li) is a production function subject to decreasing returns and τ is the payroll tax firms 
have to pay out of their wage bill.  There are M identical firms in the economy, so that 
L=MLi, and from the first-order condition aggregate labor demand is given by, 
pF´(L) = w(1+τ). 
(1) 
 
The market-clearing wage and employment levels are set to equate labor demand and 





where ε is the labor supply elasticity and b is the workers’ valuation of the benefit (i.e., b = 
1 implies a perfect link between benefits and contributions).  To see the effect of taxes on   8
wages and employment, we first substitute (2) into (1) and take the derivative with respect 
to the tax rate, which yields, 
                      dlnw/dτ = − [− ε(1+τ) / η + 1] / [− ε(1+τ) / η + (1+τ)], 
where η is the labor demand elasticity.
3  The effect of payroll taxes on employment is then 
obtained by taking the derivative of (1) with respect to the tax rate and re-arranging: 
dlnL/dτ = {[ dlnw/dτ ] (1+τ) + 1}(w/L), 
which equals zero when the tax-benefit link is perfect, b=1, when the labor supply is 
perfectly inelastic, ε=0, or when the labor demand elasticity is perfectly elastic, η→∞.
4  
This is because in all three cases taxes are fully shifted to workers as lower wages, so there 
are no disemployment effects.  However, as we discussed below, weak linkages in 
Colombia and other Latin American countries may be one reason to expect “less-than-full 
shifting” in this continent.   
In addition, an elastic labor supply probably also contributes to “less-than-full-
shifting” and disemployment effects in the Latin American context.  While we know of no 
estimates of labor supply elasticities, one may suspect the supply of formal labor to be 
fairly elastic in Latin America as workers can move between formal and informal 
employment. Our model is consistent with recent evidence on the informal sector as 
characterized by voluntary entry as a result of inefficiencies in formal sector protections 
and, more generally, as characterized by large job-to-job flows from and to the formal 
sector (see, e.g., Maloney (2004, 1999), Maloney and Bosch (2006), Maloney, Goni and 
Bosch (2007), and Levy (2006)). 
                                                           
3 This expression can also be written to show how the tax-benefit linkage, b, affects shifting.  In particular, it 
can be written as dlnw/dτ = −{ [−pF´´(L)ε[w(1+bτ)]
ε-1Nb] + 1 } / { −pF´´(L)ε[w(1+bτ)]
ε-1N(1+bτ) + (1+τ) }.   9
Moreover, downward wage rigidities may limit the ability of firms to pass payroll 
taxes in the form of lower wages, even under the three cases mentioned above.  If wage 
rigidities come from a government mandated minimum wage,⎯w , then the firm’s problem 
is as before but the wage is given by the maximum between ⎯w and the market-clearing 
wage, w*, given by pF´( [w*(1+bτ)]
ε N ) = w*(1+τ).  In the case when the minimum wage 
is binding so that ⎯w > w*, and the employment level is given by, 
pF´(L) = ⎯w(1+τ). 
In this case, there is excess supply of labor and involuntary unemployment or a rise in 
informal activity.  Moreover, the payroll tax always reduces formal employment in this 
case, since payroll taxes cannot be fully shifted to workers as lower wages. The analyses by 
Maloney and Núñez (2004), Arango and Pachón (2004), Santamaría (1998) and Bell (1997)  
all provide evidence showing that minimum wages are likely to be binding in Colombia 
making it difficult to pass payroll taxes on to workers in the form of lower wages. 
 
3. Institutional Background 
Colombia, like other Latin American countries, imposed taxes on employers to 
finance social programs during the middle of the 20
th century.  In particular, payroll taxes in 
Colombia finance pensions for the old, disabled, and survivors; health benefits for sickness 
and maternity; work injury benefits in manufacturing and commerce; family allowances 
and in-kind transfers for low-income households; and training, paid vacations and 
mandatory bonuses.
5  Payroll taxes increased along with increasing benefits between 1% 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
4 These results also hold when considering an efficiency wage set up (see Kugler and Kugler (2003)).  When 
efficiency wages are paid, the no-shirking condition shifts to counteract the shift of the labor demand function 
generating no disemployment effects. 
5 In addition, labor legislation requires employers to pay a one month per year worked severance benefit.  
After the labor market reform of 1990, the standard system of severance payments which required payments   10
and 2% in 1982, 1985, 1989 and 1992 and then sharply after 1994 due to the introduction 
of the 1993 social security reform.  Table 1 presents the evolution of mandatory non-wage 
labor costs starting in 1980.  In 1982, a statutory increase in payroll contributions for 
training increased payroll taxes by 1%.  In 1989, the payroll taxes for in-kind transfers to 
low-income families increased by 1%.  The first increase in mandated contributions for old 
age, disability, and survivor pensions occurred in 1985 with an increase of 2% (from 4.5% 
to 6.5%).  The payroll contributions for pensions increased again in 1992 by 1.5% and then 
the social security reform generated large increases in payroll taxes for pensions from 1994 
to 1996 of 5.5% for employers of workers earning less than four minimum wages and of 
6.5% for employers of workers earning more than four minimum wages.  There was an 
initial increase in payroll taxes for pensions of 3.5% in 1994, an additional increase of 1% 
in 1995 and an additional increase of between 1% and 2% for high- and low-wage workers, 
respectively.  The social security reform also increased payroll contributions between 1994 
and 1996 by 5% for health benefits for the first time in decades, with a 1% increase in 1995 
and an additional 4% increase in 1996.  The social security reform, therefore, increased 
payroll taxes for pensions and health by between 10.5% and 11.5% in a two-year period, 
with between 5% and 6% of the increase occurring between 1995 and 1996.  This provides 
a large temporal change in payroll taxes, which is much larger than what is usually 
observed in high income countries.  Our analysis below relies largely on the statutory 
changes in payroll taxes described here. 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
at the time of separation was transformed into a system of individual savings accounts (see A. Kugler (1999, 
2004, 2005) for a description and analysis of the labor market reform of 1990).  Thus, before the labor market 
reform of 1990, severance payments were fixed costs but, after the reform, they were essentially turned into 
recurrent labor costs such as payroll taxes.   11
As described in the previous section, payroll taxes should not affect employment if 
payroll taxes are completely passed on to workers as lower wages.  This is more likely to 
happen if the workers’ valuations of the services financed by payroll taxes coincide with 
their cost.  However, in Colombia, as in other Latin American countries, the link between 
payroll taxes and benefits is not exact because many of the benefits financed through 
payroll taxes are not directly accrued by employees.  For example, while all employers pay 
taxes to finance family allowances, these allowances are received only by workers with 
low-income families.  Also, while all employers pay taxes for training programs, not all 
firms take advantage of government-provided training programs.  For this reason, payroll 
taxes are less likely to be passed-on to wages in Colombia and other Latin American 
countries than in developed countries where employer mandated contributions tend to 
finance direct benefits. 
In addition, the social security reform changed the tax-benefit linkage for pensions.  
On the one hand, the social security reform introduced minimum benefits for workers 
previously uncovered by the system, weakening the tax-benefit linkage. On the other hand, 
by introducing a parallel fully-funded system of individual accounts next to the already 
existing pay-as-you-go (PAYG) system, the reform contributed to strengthen the tax-
benefit linkage. Unlike the PAYG system which may not return to the beneficiary the 
amount contributed into the system, individual accounts guarantee direct benefits to 
contributors to the system and are likely to have strengthened the tax-benefit linkage during 
the 1990s. At the same time, trade liberalization increased labor demand elasticities after 
the reduction of tariffs and quotas in 1991. Fajnzylber and Maloney (2005) find evidence 
that the introduction of Colombia’s trade reform in 1991 increased labor demand elasticities 
for unskilled workers. As shown in the previous section, an increase in labor demand   12
elasticities should increase shifting during the 1990s compared to the 1980s. In the 
empirical analysis, we indeed find greater shifting and smaller disemployment effects in the 
1990s than in the 1980s. 
As discussed in the previous section, aside from weak tax-benefit linkages, firms 
may not be able to pass on their higher payroll taxes to workers in the form of lower wages 
if minimum wages are binding.  Evidence on the minimum wage in Colombia over the 
period of our study suggests that the minimum wage binds for unskilled workers and may 
have spillover effects for skilled workers in Colombia. Bell (1997) finds that the 10% rise 
in the statutory minimum wage during 1981-87 decreased unskilled employment by 
between 2% and 12%. Using data from the rotating household panel starting in 1997, 
Maloney and Núñez (2004) find an average elasticity of employment with respect to the 
minimum wage of 0.15 for this later period, which is equivalent to Bell’s upper bound.  
Moreover, Maloney and Núñez (2004) examine the impact of the minimum wage on the 
wages and employment of workers at different points in the distribution.  They find that the 
minimum wage in Colombia increased wages and reduced employment for those close to 
the minimum wage but also for those higher up in the distribution because of a numeraire 
effect.  Similarly, Maloney and Núñez (2004) find evidence of binding minimum wages in 
other Latin American countries, where minimum wages seem to affect not only those at the 
lower end of the earnings distribution but also higher earnings workers.  Arango and 
Pachón (2004) use repeated cross-sections of the Colombian household surveys from 1984 
and 2001 and they find that the minimum wage affects the earnings not only of those close 
to the minimum wage but also the earnings of those higher up in the distribution, and   13
reduces the probability of employment as well as hours worked.
6  An important implication 
of these results is that minimum wages generate real rigidities not only for unskilled but 
also for more skilled workers. 
 
4.   Empirical Analysis 
4.1. Data Description 
We analyze the impact of payroll taxes on employment and labor costs in Colombia 
by exploiting the large temporal variation induced by the statutory rise in employer 
contributions over the 1980s and mostly during the 1990s.  Our sample consists of a 
balanced panel of 235 plants in the formal sector from the Colombian Manufacturing 
Survey for the 1982-1996 period.
7  The trends in our sample coincide with the general 
picture in manufacturing as a whole.  Table 2 shows the continuous rise in the real wage 
and the drop in employment since 1991.
8 
The last two columns of Table 2 also show the trends in GDP growth and GDP per 
capita growth.  Aside from the first two years when GDP growth is low and GDP per capita 
growth is actually negative, the Colombian economy shows strong growth ranging from 2.0 
to 5.8.  A potential concern is that our data ends right before the beginning of the strongest 
recession in almost 60 years.  If the beginning of this recession drives both earnings and 
employment down, then our estimates may be biased towards finding shifting and towards 
finding disemployment.  However, as we show below we are far from finding full shifting, 
                                                           
6 Santamaría (1998) similarly finds evidence of a binding minimum wage in Colombia. 
7 The Colombian Manufacturing Survey only samples plants with more than 10 employees.  All plants in our 
sample report positive payroll taxes, thus, implying compliance with labor legislation (at least for some of 
their employees) and participation in the formal sector.  We focus on the impact of payroll taxes on the 
internal margin using a balanced panel, because spurious entry and exit resulting from changes in the survey 
methodology over the 1990s makes it more difficult to estimate effects on the external margin.  In this sense, 
we probably provide a lower bound on the impact of payroll taxes on formal employment. 
8 Wages are deflated by a sector-specific producer price index.   14
as our estimates suggest that only between 14% and 23% of the taxes are passed on as 
lower wages.  In addition, to address this issue, below we pick pairs of years with changes 
in tax rates that look similar in terms of growth. 
Table 2 also shows the trend in average tax rates over the sample period.  The 
average tax rate is calculated as the ratio of total contributions to the wage bill.  The table 
shows the upward trend over the 1980s, a drop in the early 1990s and the sharp rise in tax 
rates starting in 1993 coinciding with the statutory changes in payroll taxes reported in 
Table 1.  An advantage of our data is that, while the changes in payroll taxes coincide with 
the statutory changes, we can rely on actual information of the payroll tax cost rather than 
having to impute the average cost to plants. 
The data shows that most of the variation of changes in tax rates corresponds to 
statutory changes in taxes over time.  Figures 1 to 4 show tax changes for pairs of years 
during the 1980s. Figure 1 shows the distribution of changes in tax rates between 1984 and 
1985.  The figure shows that the mean of the distribution of changes in taxes is 1.95% or 
slightly under the 2% statutory change in taxes.  Moreover, the changes above and below 
the 1.95% change are close to being normally distributed with 75% of the plants having tax 
rate changes between 1.75% and 2.15%.  Similarly, Figure 2 shows the distribution of 
changes in tax rates in between 1988 and 1989, which has a mean of 0.995% or virtually 
the 1% statutory change reported in Table 1.  In addition, the changes in tax rates are tightly 
distributed around the 0.995% with 80% of the plants having tax rate changes between 
0.87% and 1.12%.  By contrast Figures 3 and 4 show the changes in tax rates between 1983 
and 1984 and between 1989 and 1990, when there were no statutory changes in taxes.  The 
changes in taxes for these years are indeed centered at zero and there are very small 
changes above and below 0 ranging from -0.02% to 0.02%.   15
Figures 5 and 6 show the distribution of changes in tax rates between 1993 and 1994 
and between 1995 and 1996.  The mean of the changes in tax rates between 1993 and 1994 
in Figure 5 is 4%.  The distribution is close to normal with 95% of the plants tax changes 
ranging between 3.98% and 4.02%.  Figure 6 shows mean changes in taxes of 5.8%, while 
the statutory changes were between 5.5% and 6%.  This distribution also has dispersion 
above and below the mean tax change; with about 75% of the plants have tax changes 
ranging from 5.2% to 6.4%. 
These distributions of changes in tax rates show that the data closely captures the 
statutory changes in tax rates that took place in Colombia over the 1980s and 1990s. In 
addition, the distributions show that cross-sectional variation of changes in tax rates across 
plants is generally small.  Perhaps more importantly, when the measured tax rate changes 
deviate from the statutory change, these changes in taxes are both above and below the 
statutory change. The fact that there are changes above the statutory changes suggests that 
these deviations do not simply reflect plants’ decisions to use temporary contracts or to hire 
underground as a way to reduce their tax payments.  Likewise, the deviations in Figure 6 
are unlikely to simply reflect plants’ move towards hiring more low earnings workers after 
the statutory change in 1996 as a way to avoid higher taxes for workers earning more than 
four times the minimum wage, since some of the changes are actually greater than the 
statutory changes.
9 
                                                           
9 Many of the actual changes are above the statutory changes and plants would not generally make 
adjustments that increase their payroll costs. However, if plants adjusted to increases in payroll taxes by 
hiring more temporary workers as a way to avoid these costs, then the bias would be against finding shifting.  
Similarly, if plants adjusted to the differential increase in taxes for high earnings workers by hiring more low 
earnings workers, this would generate a bias against finding pass-through. On the other hand, it is not clear 
what the sign would be on the bias or if there should be a bias for the employment results as a result of these 
adjustments.   16
One reason why changes in tax rates may be both above and below the statutory 
changes is the fact that employers’ work injury contributions depend on the degree of risk, 
where the payroll taxes range from 0.35% to 8.7% (see Table 1) depending on the risk of 
injury at the plant.  Thus, increases or decreases in injury risk at a plant would affect the 
payroll tax contributions at that plant over time.  Deviations of changes in tax rates from 
statutory changes due to differences in the nature of the risk pool would generate a valid 
source of identification to examine the impact of taxes on wages and employment.  
However, another reason why actual changes in tax rates may be above or below the 
statutory changes is because of measurement error due to misreporting or recording errors 
in the tax and wage bills.  Classical measurement error in the tax bill will bias the effects of 
payroll taxes on wages and employment towards zero, while measurement error in the wage 
bill will bias the results towards a finding of shifting to wages and the effect of payroll 
taxes on employment towards zero.  We follow Gruber’s (1997) identification strategy by 
assuming that there is a dimension of variation along which the true tax rate varies, but the 
spurious components of the measured tax rate do not.  First, we assume that plants 
systematically overstate or understate the tax rate so that fixed plant-specific measurement 
error is absorbed by plant effects.  We also assume that any spurious time-varying 
component of tax rates follows linear sector-specific or plant-specific trends.  These 
approaches also help to control for omitted variables correlated with tax rates.  For 
example, these control for the possibility that systematically high wage workplaces are also 
the ones with the lowest fraction of uncovered payroll or the ones with the highest risk of 
accidents, if the fact that a plant is high wage is mostly fixed over time or follows sector-
specific or plant-specific trends. 
   17
4.2. Results 
Table 2 shows that the social security reform of 1993 coincided with an expansion 
right before a recession.  Following Gruber (1997), we therefore restrict the analysis to 
years at similar points in the cycle.  For the 1980s, we use 1983-1984 and 1989-90 for pairs 
of expansionary years and 1984-85 and 1988-89 for pairs of recessionary years.  For the 
1990s, we use 1993-94 and 1995-96 as pairs of years at similar points in the business cycle 
before and after the full implementation of the social security reform. 
  The post-1992 data, for which we cannot separate production and non-production 
workers are used to estimate: 
   Δlog(Wijt /Eijt) = α1 + β1 Δτijt + θt + uijt, 
(1) 
 
Δlog(Eijt) = α2 + β2 Δτijt + θt + eijt, 
(2) 
 
where the ratio of total payroll taxes, Tijt, over total wages, Wijt, gives the tax rate for plant i 
in sector j at time t, i.e., τijt = (Tijt  /Wijt), and where Eijt is total employment.  These 
regressions include year effects, θt, while differencing eliminates plant effects.  Since the 
regressions are estimated in first differences, the identifying information is actually coming 
from the changes in the tax rate across years shown in Figures 1-6.  Moreover, the 
identifying assumption is that omitted variables are absorbed by year, sector, and plant 
controls.  We also add sector effects, γj, to the specifications in differences to control for 
sector-specific trends: 
    Δ log(Wijt /Eijt) = α3 + β3 Δτijt + θt +  γj + uijt, 
(3) 
 
Δ log(Eijt) = α4 + β4 Δτijt + θt + γj + eijt. 
(4) 
   18
Finally, we estimate models that control for plant-specific trends by adding plant effects, ϕi, 
to the specification in differences: 
      Δ log(Wijt /Eijt) = α5 + β5 Δτijt + θt + ϕi + uijt, 
(5) 
 
Δ log (Eijt) = α6 + β6 Δτijt + θt + ϕi + eijt. 
(6) 
 
  In addition to pooled analyses, that group all types of workers, pre-1992 data are 
used to estimate models for production and non-production workers separately, i.e., fully 
saturated models of (1) and (2).  We estimate these differences regressions with and 
without sector effects.  The specifications with sector effects allow the true variation in 
taxes to be along the plant-year and the plant-year-worker type dimensions controlling for 
sector-specific trends for each worker type, i.e., fully saturated versions of models (3) and 
(4).  Again, we add plant effects as in the pooled models, so we estimate fully saturated 
versions of (5) and (6) for production and non-production workers. 
While the data for the 1990s do not disaggregate production and non-production 
workers, the large temporal change in payroll taxes occurred during this time period after 
the social security reform.  Columns (1) and (2) in Table 3 report estimates of the impact of 
payroll taxes on the wages and employment of production and non-production workers 
during the 1990s.  In particular, the first two rows report differences results with and 
without sector effects estimated using equations (1)-(4).  The results without controlling for 
sector-specific effects suggest that an increase in payroll taxes of a similar magnitude to the 
increase that followed the 1993 social security reform (i.e., a 10% increase) reduces wages 
by 1.42% and employment by 2.73%.  Controlling for sector-specific trends shows larger 
effects on both wages and employment, suggesting measurement error on the tax rate rather   19
than on wages.
10  In particular, the results with sector-specific trends suggest that a 10% 
increase in the payroll tax rate reduces wages by 1.87% and employment by 3.05%.  The 
results controlling for plant-specific trends in the third row show even larger shifting and 
disemployment effects.  In particular, a 10% increase in the payroll tax rate reduces wages 
by 2.35% and employment by 3.84%.  These wage and employment effects are also in line 
with those found by Heckman and Pagés (2004) using panel data for Latin American 
countries.  They find that a 10% increase in social security contributions reduces wages and 
employment in Latin America by 3.6% and 4.5%, respectively. 
The rest of the columns in Table 3 show the results for the pre-1992 years, pooling 
together production and non-production workers.  In particular, the table reports results 
with and without controls for sector-specific trends estimated using equations (1)-(2) and 
(3)-(4) as well as results with controls for plant-specific trends, i.e., equations (5)-(6).  The 
results from the differences specification, which controls for sector-specific trends, show 
partial shifting of payroll taxes to wages and negative effects on employment.
11  I n  
particular, the results for both the expansion and recession pre-1992 years show that a 10% 
increase in payroll taxes during the expansionary years of the 1980s decreases wages by 
1.75% and employment by 2.1%.  However, when we control for plant-specific effects, 
shifting becomes smaller and disemployment effects larger during recession years.  The 
results for the expansionary pre-1992 years, which control for plant-specific trends, suggest 
that a 10% increase in payroll tax rates reduces average wages by 2.27% and employment 
by close to 5%.  By contrast, the results for the recession pre-1992 years suggest that a 10% 
                                                           
10 We find that the sector effects are significantly different from each other. The F-statistics of the test of a 
null of equality across sectors in the wage and employment regressions using data on the 1990s are 0.027 and 
0.011 respectively. 
11 The tests of equality of sector effects for the wage and employment regressions using recessionary year data 
yield F-statistics of 0.048 and 0.026. In expansion years, the corresponding F-statistics are 0.019 and 0.039.     20
rise in payroll taxes reduces employment by 5% but lowers wages by only 1.37% 
suggesting less shifting during recessions. 
The results for the 1980s can be compared with the results for the 1990s to check 
whether the change in tax-benefit linkages generated by the social security reform affected 
the effects of payroll taxes on shifting and employment.  As discussed above, the social 
security reform weakened the tax-benefit linkage due to the introduction of minimum 
pensions.  At the same time, the movement from a PAYG system to a fully-funded system 
probably strengthened the tax-benefit linkage.  Results with plant-effects suggest that 
shifting increased after the introduction of the reform, suggesting the movement to a fully-
funded system was probably more important than the introduction of minimum pensions.  
Moreover, greater shifting could also be explained by an increase in labor demand 
elasticities during this period.  As indicated above, Fajnzylber and Maloney (2005) indeed 
find evidence that labor demand elasticities increased for blue collar workers in Colombia 
after trade was liberalized in 1991.  Consistent with more shifting, the results with plant-
effects also suggest less disemployment after the introduction of the trade and social 
security reforms in the 1990s. 
Table 4 reports results for the pre-1992 years, for which it is possible to separate 
production and non-production workers.  In particular, the table reports results of 
specifications estimated using equations (1) and (2) and of specifications controlling for 
sector-specific and plant-specific trends estimated using equations (3)-(6).  Consistent with 
minimum wages binding more for production than for non-production workers, these 
results show less shifting to wages for production than for non-production workers.   
Moreover, consistent with less shifting for production workers, the results indicate greater 
negative effects of payroll taxes on the employment of production than of non-production   21
workers.  Columns (1)-(4) report results using data for the expansionary pre-1992 years.  
Results from specifications which control for sector-specific trends suggest that a 10% 
increase in payroll taxes reduce production wages by less than 1% but reduce non-
production wages by 2.68%, and these are significantly different from each other at the 1% 
level.
12  Consistent with less shifting for production workers, these results also suggest that 
a 10% increase in payroll taxes reduces employment for production workers by close to 4% 
and for non-production workers by close to 2%, where the difference between production 
and non-production workers is significant at the 2% level.   
Results controlling for plant-specific trends rather than sector-specific trends show 
greater shifting and bigger disemployment effects for both groups, but continue to show 
greater shifting for non-production workers.  These results suggest that a 10% increase in 
payroll taxes reduces the production wages by 1.39% and non-production wages by 2.89 
(the p-value of the difference in wage effects between production and non-production is 
0.058), while reducing employment of production workers by 5.49% and employment of 
non-production workers by 4.9%, though the employment effects for production and non-
production workers are not significantly different from each other. 
Columns (5)-(8) in Table 4 report similar results for the recessionary pre-1992 
years.  These estimates generally show less shifting and larger disemployment effects for 
production than for non-production workers as a result of higher payroll taxes.  Yet, the 
results also show more shifting for production workers and less shifting for non-production 
workers during recessionary years than expansionary years.  Non-production workers, who 
are less likely to be laid-off during recessions, may be less willing to take wage cuts.   
                                                           
12 Tests of equality of the sector effects in the production and the non-production wage regressions have F-
statistics of 0.014 and 0.041, respectively. For the employment regressions, the statistics are 0.034 and 0.022.   22
By contrast, production workers would be more willing to take wage cuts given the 
higher threat of layoffs for them.  The specification controlling for sector-specific trends 
suggest that a 10% increase in payroll taxes reduces the wages and employment of 
production workers by 1.1% and 3.25% and reduces the wages and employment of non-
production workers by 1.9% and 1.97%.
13  As for the expansionary years, controlling for 
plant-specific trends increases shifting and disemployment effects for both groups, though 
shifting continues to be greater for non-production workers.  In particular, the results show 
that a 10% increase in payroll taxes reduce production wages by 1.46% and non-production 
wages by 2.75%, while reducing production employment by 5.14% and non-production 
employment by 4.38%.   
However, shifting coefficients between production and non-production workers 
during recession are not significantly different from each other, probably because non-
production workers are less likely to adjust wages downwards during recessions while 
production workers are more likely to accept bigger wage cuts during recessions to avoid 
losing their jobs.  On the other hand, the results for production and non-production workers 
during expansionary years suggest that policies aimed at boosting the relative demand of 
production workers by reducing payroll taxes for this group of workers are likely to be 




Payroll taxes and other regulations are often blamed for reducing formal 
employment in developing countries. In theory, however, the employment consequences of 
                                                           
13 For the wage regressions, tests of equality of sector effects for production and non-production workers yield 
F-statistics of 0.000 and 0.002, respectively. For the employment regressions, the corresponding F-statistics 
are 0.008 and 0.032.   23
payroll taxes depend on the extent to which they can be passed-on to workers in the form of 
lower wages.  In this paper, we exploit a very large increase in payroll taxes following the 
social security reform in Colombia in 1993 to study the impact of these taxes on 
employment and wages.  In terms of identification in our estimation, an advantage of this 
reform is that the increase in payroll taxes was much larger than it is typically observed in 
developed countries and even in other developing countries. Moreover, unlike other 
reforms in the region, because the Colombian reform increased (rather than decreased) 
payroll taxes, we can study whether payroll taxes are passed-on to workers as lower wages. 
Our estimates suggest that only about one fifth of the increase in taxes was 
shifted to workers as lower wages. This is roughly in line with Heckman and Pagés’ (2004) 
results which show a one-third shifting of payroll taxes using cross-sectional data for Latin 
America.  Complementing the partial shifting result, our findings show that a 10% increase 
in payroll taxes reduces formal employment by between 4% and 5%.  In addition, there 
appears to be less shifting and greater negative effects of payroll taxes on formal 
employment for production than for non-production workers, especially during 
expansionary years.  These results suggest that tax subsidies for less skilled workers may be 
particularly effective, especially if applied to indirect benefits and during expansionary 
years. 
A natural avenue for future research in the context of less developed countries 
would be to study the labor supply consequences of payroll taxes and, in particular, to study 
whether workers displaced from formal employment following the rise in payroll taxes 
move into unemployment or informal sector employment.   24
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Table 1: Composition of Payroll Taxes, 1980-1996 
Notes: Work injury compensation taxes only apply to workers in manufacturing and commerce and depend on the degree of 
risk faced by the firm.  In 1996, payroll tax contributions for pensions increased from 12.5% to 13.5% for employers of 
workers earning less than four minimum wages and to 14.5% for employers of workers earning more than four minimum 
wages.  The paid vacations and bonuses contributions reported in the table are the minimum paid vacations and bonuses 
mandated by law, but firms’ payroll contributions for paid vacations and bonuses may vary because some firms offer their 
employees paid vacations and bonuses above these minimum levels.  Severance pay were paid upon separation prior to the 
labor market reform of 1990, but after the reform they were turned into payroll taxes deposited in an individual savings 
accounts on a monthly basis. 
Payroll Tax 1980 1982 1985 1989 1992 1994 1995 1996
Pensions 4.5% 4.5% 6.5% 6.5% 8.0% 11.5% 12.5% 13.5% -
14.5%
Health 7.0% 7.0% 7.0% 7.0% 7.0% 7.0% 8.0% 12.0%


















2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 3.0% 3.0% 3.0% 3.0% 3.0%
Family
Allowances
4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0%
Training 1.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0%
Paid
Vacations
4.15% 4.15% 4.15% 4.15% 4.15% 4.15% 4.15% 4.15%
Mandatory
Bonuses
4.15% 4.15% 4.15% 4.15% 4.15% 4.15% 4.15% 4.15%
Severance
Pay

















Table 2:  Time Series Data on the Labor Market 
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Notes: Tax rates are the employer contributions as a fraction of wages. Real wages are total wages over number of workers 





Table 3: Estimates of the Effects of Payroll Taxes  
on Wages and Employment, All Workers 
 
    
1990s, Expansion Years 
   






















              




  -0.1685   
(0.0602) 
-0.1925   
(0.0389) 




              




  -0.1746   
(0.0318) 
-0.2093   
(0.0343) 
-0.1752   
(0.0863) 
-0.2086    
(0.0704) 
              




  -0.2274   
(0.0435) 
-0.5031   
(0.0928) 
-0.1369     
(0.0625) 
-0.4983   
(0.0471) 
              
 
Notes: The table reports results from regressions of first-differences specifications without sector and year effects, with sector effects and with firm 
effects using data for 1993-94 and 1995-96 in Columns (1) and (2), using data for 1983-84 and 1989-90 for the expansion years in Columns (3) and 
(4), and using data for 1984-85 and 1988-89 for the recession years in Columns (5) and (6).  The specifications using pooled data for the 1980s 





Table 4: Estimates of Effects of Payroll Taxes on Wages and Employment  
during the 1980s, Production and Non-production Workers 
 
    Expansion Years  Recession Years 
 





























                     
NO NO  -0.0802 
(0.0485) 
-0.2782   
(0.0228) 
 -0.2252   
(0.0532) 
-0.2119   
(0.0706) 




  -0.1006   
(0.0644) 
-0.1944   
(0.0734) 
                    




  -0.2683   
(0.0339) 
-0.2008   
(0.0742) 
-0.1094   
(0.0526) 
-0.3246   
(0.0764) 
  -0.1897      
(0.0964) 
-0.1974   
(0.0471) 
                    
















                      
 
Notes: The table reports results from regressions of first-differences specifications without sector and firm effects, with sector effects and with firm 
effects using data for 1983-84 and 1989-90 for the expansion years and using data for 1984-85 and 1988-89 for the recession years.  Standard errors 
are in parenthesis. 
  


























Figure 6: Distribution of Tax Rate Changes between 1995 and 1996 
 
 
 